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REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS: CAN JUDICIARY PROVIDE ADEQUATE SOLUTION?  
  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
The current system for the provision of pharmaceuticals is highly inefficient.
1
  The world 
spends $1 trillion on medicines.
2
  In the United States, the total healthcare system spending on 
pharmaceuticals has reached $320 billion in 2011.
3
  Millions of people face suffering or death 
because they cannot afford the patented drugs sold at 20 to 50 times their cost of production.
4
  
Prices of medicines directly affect their accessibility, even in the countries with universal 
insurance system like the United Kingdom.
5
   
The US government created an incentive for the pharmaceutical innovators by awarding 
them with patent rights which grant an “exclusive rights to use the patented product, enabling 
high mark-ups through which innovators can profit if demand for the product is large enough 
even at high prices.”6  A patent gives to its owner a legal right to exclude others, for limited time 
periods, from making, using, or selling the patented product without the patent owner’s 
permission, and the state sanctions the violators of the patent rights.
7
  The proponents of strong 
patent protection for pharmaceutical companies note the importance of providing an incentive for 
                                                            
1 Danielle Celermajer & Thomas Pogge,  A Cure for All Ills of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme, THE SYDNEY 
MORNING HERALD (March 7, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/a-cure-for-all-ills-of-the-
pharmaceutical-benefits-scheme-20120306-1ui91.html. 
2 Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge, Vision & Origin of the Health Impact Fund, HEALTH IMPACT FUND (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2013), http://healthimpactfund.com/origin.  
3 The Use of Medicines in the United States: Review of 2011, IMS INSTITUTE FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Apr. 
2012), 
http://www.imshealth.com/ims/Global/Content/Insights/IMS%20Institute%20for%20Healthcare%20Informatics/IHI
I_Medicines_in_U.S_Report_2011.pdf. 
4 Celermajer, supra note 1. 
5 Amitava Banerjee, Aidan Hollis & Thomas Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Incentives for Improving Access to 
Medicines, 375 THE LANCET 166 (Jan. 9, 2010), http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-
6736(09)61296-4/fulltext?_eventId=login. 
6 Id. 
7 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006). 
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innovation.
8
  According to this standpoint,
 9
 the social good resulting from the development of 
new medicines outweighs the anti-competitive effects of patents which protect the patentees’ 
prices from competition.
10
  The patent owners further justify high prices for their drugs by 
emphasizing the immense financial burdens of pharmaceutical research and development.
11
  The 
cost incurred by the pharmaceutical companies is at least in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
for each successful product.
12
  Hence, the pharmaceutical companies should be entitled to 
financial returns promoted by a system with strong patent protection.
13
 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act,
14
 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (“the Act”), to encourage the generic drug 
manufacturers to challenge weak patents of the brand name drug companies, thereby ensuring 
that lower cost generic versions of the drug are available to public.
15
  If such challenges are 
successful, they result in substantial cost cutting for both the consumers and the health care 
system by allowing the generic drugs to enter the market long before the expiration of the brand 
name manufacturers’ patents.16  The pharmaceutical and generic drug companies, however, have 
found a way to circumvent the provisions of the Act.  By settling the patent challenge lawsuits, 
the companies still benefit from the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions but effectively undermine the 
Act’s goals of lowering the drug prices and making pharmaceuticals more accessible to the 
                                                            
8 William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 667 (2007).   
9 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Improved Patent Protection 
Worldwide, 2 J. L. & TECH. 307, 307 (1987) (“Only effective patent protection provides the incentives necessary to 
enable pharmaceutical companies to commit the required resources.”). 
10 Fisher, supra note 8 at 667-68. 
11 Banerjee, supra note 5. 
12 Id. 
13 Fisher, supra note 8 at 668. 
14 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).   
15 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006). 
16 Eugene R. Quinn, FTC Seeks SCOTUS Review in AndroGel “Pay-for-Delay” Case, IPWATCHDOG (Oct 4, 2012, 
6:06 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/10/04/ftc-seeks-scotus-review-androgel/id=28563.   
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public.  These settlements, where brand name pharmaceutical companies pay generic drug 
producers to delay entering the market, are known as “reverse payment settlements,” “reverse 
settlements,” or pay-for-delay” agreements17 because a patent holder makes the payment to a 
patent challenger.  Studies by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) have found that reverse 
settlements result in the annual cost of $3.5 billion to consumers from the loss of competition 
caused by the delay of generic drug entry into the market.
18
  The issue of whether a reverse 
payment settlement is the act of unlawful monopoly or merely a settlement favorable to both 
companies became a subject of a sharp dispute in all three branches of government and created a 
split among the circuits.
19
  Some proposed solutions to the controversy take a patent law posture, 
others an antitrust approach, and neither the judiciary nor the legislature appears to be willing to 
embrace a more effective middle-ground approach proposed by scholars.
20
  This Comment 
delineates a global solution based on the use of financial regulation and the creation of a new 
payment system to control the prices of brand name pharmaceutical.  This proposal would not 
only address the damaging results of reverse payment settlements but significantly improve 
access to pharmaceutical worldwide.  
 Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the Hatch-Waxman framework.  Part III 
explains the harmful effects of reverse payment settlements on the consumers and reasons why 
these settlements, unlike other settlements, should not be favored over litigation under the public 
policy.  Part IV addresses in detail the circuit split regarding the appropriate standard to evaluate 
                                                            
17 See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Setlements in Hatch-Waxman 
Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1305, 1315 (2010); see also Scott A. Backus, Reversing Course on Reverse Payment 
Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Has Schering-Plough Created the Blueprint for Defensible Antitrust 
Violations?, 60 Okla. L. Rev. 375 (2007) (the agreements are sometimes referred to as “pay for delay, exit, or 
exclusion payment settlements”).   
18 FTC, Pay-for-Delay:  How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf. 
19 Hayden W. Gregory, Sorting Things Out: Patents, Antitrust Law, and Settlement of Hatch-Waxman Act 
Infringement Suits, LANDSLIDE, Sept.-Oct. 2012, at 3. 
20 Id. 
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the legality of the reverse settlements.  Part V describes the proposed legislative solutions, none 
of which were ultimately adopted by Congress. Part VI addresses various approaches to the pay 
for delay controversy proposed by renowned scholars and pertinent administrative agencies.  Part 
VII evaluates the most effective judicial solution while taking into account the applicable public 
policy considerations. Finally, Part VIII explains why even the most effective judicial solution 
would only resolve a small fraction of the overall problem of drug accessibility and provides an 
overview of the new fair, cost-effective ways to pay for pharmaceutical innovation outside of the 
patent system, which could work globally or nationally to address the crucial problem of drug 
accessibility worldwide and in the United States.  
II.  THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT FRAMEWORK IN PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LITIGATION 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act encourages generic manufacturers to compete with name brand 
companies and to attempt to enter the market by filing a paragraph IV certification.
21
  The 
pharmaceutical company which seeks to begin marketing a new prescription drug must obtain an 
approval from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).22  This requires the company to 
submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) listing extensive information about the drug, including 
any patents pertaining to the drug’s components and indications. 23  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
allows a potential generic drug manufacturer to submit an abbreviated application for approval 
with the FDA, also known as an Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”).24  In filing an 
ANDA, the generic manufacturer can rely on the FDA’s prior ruling approving the NDA filed by 
the brand name company.
25
  The generic manufacturer who files an ANDA must also recognize 
                                                            
21 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
22 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). 
23 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
24 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (the Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 301-399).  
25 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
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any patents covering the brand name drug and certify that, “in the opinion of the applicant and to 
the best of his knowledge,” the patent is either invalid or it is not infringed by the proposed 
generic drug (known as “paragraph IV certification”).26  The ANDA applicant must also notify, 
in writing, every patentee affected by the ANDA that the applicant has filed a paragraph IV 
certification.
27
  The patentee will have 45 days after the generic manufacturer submits its 
paragraph IV certification to file a patent infringement lawsuit.
28
  Filing of the suit will trigger an 
automatic stay – the FDA will postpone its approval of the generic drug until either 30 months 
pass, or a district court determines that the patent is either invalid or not infringed, whichever is 
earlier.
29
 
 The Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive to the generic manufacturers in form of 
the 180-day exclusivity period to encourage generic production and challenge brand name 
patents.
30
  Following FDA approval of the ANDA, the first generic manufacturer who files a 
paragraph IV certification is entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period during which the generic 
manufacturer has an exclusive right to commercially market its drug.
31
  The exclusivity period 
begins to run when the first ANDA applicant puts its drug on the market, and the subsequent 
ANDA applications by other generic drug companies will not be approved by the FDA during 
this period.
32
  This allows the successful challengers of brand name drug patents to sell their 
                                                            
26 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(III)-(IV); for a more detailed explanation see Angela Foster and Ebony J. Foster, 
Reverse Payment Settlements: ‘Legal, Illegal or Unlawful’, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY & LIFE SCIENCES, 209 N.J.L.J. 
916, at S-4 (Sept. 17, 2012).  
27 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I); see also Gregory, supra note 19, at 3 (“By statute, a paragraph IV certification is 
an act of infringement.”). 
28 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
29 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I). 
30 Eugene R. Quinn, Pharma Reverse Patent Payments Are Not An Antitrust Violation, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 29, 
2010, 4:41 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/04/29/reverse-payments-not-antitrust-violation/id=10339.  
31 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
32 Id. 
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generic versions of the drugs at extremely competitive prices.
33
   
 It is important to note that only the first filer of the ANDA with a paragraph IV 
certification is entitled to the 180-day period of market exclusivity:
34
 “even if the first filer never 
becomes eligible to use its 180-day exclusivity period because it settles, loses, or withdraws the 
litigation, that potential benefit will not pass to subsequent filers.”35  The first applicant is 
typically the most determined to challenge the patent of the brand name company.
36
  Ideally, at 
the culmination of the 180-day window, all generic drug manufacturers would be able to enter 
the market quickly after the first filer’s successful challenge of the patent. 37  As a result, the 
consumers would have access to low-cost generic drugs in accordance with the goals of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.
38
  This part of the framework is what allows the companies to easily 
undermine the objectives of the Act.
39
  A brand name patentee can simply settle the patent 
challenge lawsuit by paying off the first ANDA filer.
 40
  Any subsequent generic manufacturers 
can file a paragraph IV certification, but because they are not entitled to the 180-day exclusivity 
period, they lose the incentive to challenge the patent.
41
  As a result, the brand name company 
who owns even the weakest patent successfully avoids any generic competition until the end of 
                                                            
33 Quinn, supra note 30. 
34 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii). 
35 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 
2012) (No. 12-245), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm; 
petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(D)(iii))). 
36 See C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1583 (2006) (indicating that there is “a sharp difference in incentives . . . between [the] 
ANDA-IV filer and all other generic firms”). 
37 Quinn, supra note 30. 
38 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14-15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48. 
39 David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 331 (2000) 
(“The competitive concern is that the 180-day exclusivity provision can be used strategically by a patent holder to 
prolong its market power in ways that go beyond the intent of the patent laws and the Hatch-Waxman Act by 
delaying generic entry for a substantial period.”). 
40K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204; see also Quinn, supra note 30.  
41 Id. 
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the patent term.
42
   
Aware of the possibility of antitrust violations resulting from reverse settlements,
43
 
Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003 to require pharmaceutical companies who 
settled patent challenge lawsuits to file their settlement agreements with the FTC and the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for antitrust examination.44  While the FTC has vigorously 
opposed reverse payment settlements, the federal circuits have disagreed as to the lawfulness of 
the reverse payment settlements, creating a split.
45
   
III.  THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF THE REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
According to a 2010 study conducted by the FTC, “[p]ay-for-delay agreements are 
estimated to cost American consumers $3.5 billion per year – $35 billion over the next 10 years” 
due to the unavailability of lower-cost generic drugs.
46
  About a year after the first generic 
version of a drug enters the market, this generic version, on average, replaces over 90% of the 
brand name company’s unit sales. 47  In addition, the price of the generic version is 
approximately 85% lower than the price of the brand name pharmaceutical prior to the market 
                                                            
42 Quinn, supra note 30; see also 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New Drug Applications, 64 
Fed. Reg. 42,873, 42,882-83 (Aug. 6, 1999) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 314) (“It can be mutually beneficial for the 
innovator and the generic company that is awarded 180 days of generic exclusivity to enter into agreements that 
block generic competition for extended periods. This delayed competition harms consumers by slowing the 
introduction of lower priced products into the market and thwarts the intent of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments.”). 
43 See S. Rep. No. 107-167, at 4 (2002). 
44 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 204 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-1118, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j))).  
45 Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Why Consumers and the Federal 
Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescription Drugs: Hearing on H.R. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts 
and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 (2009) (prepared statement of Richard A. 
Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P859910payfordelay.pdf.  
46 FTC, Pay for Delay: How Drug Company Pay Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf (citing Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
“Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, 
Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) at 8 (June 23, 2009), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf)). 
47 FTC, supra note 46. 
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entry of the generic drug.
48
  Because of the sharp difference between the generic and the brand 
name drug prices, the entry of the generic drug on the market amounts to a significant benefit to 
the consumers but results in a loss of revenue to the brand name producers.
49
  To avoid this 
revenue loss, makers of brand name pharmaceuticals offer to settle the litigation challenging 
their drug patent.   
Generally, public policy favors settlements over expensive and lengthy litigation process.  
In the Hatch-Waxman context, however, the FTC posits that courts should presume that reverse 
settlements are unlawful because they violate antitrust laws and unnecessarily increase 
consumers’ health care costs by billions of dollars.50  Similarly, the DOJ has opined that reverse 
settlements should be presumed unlawful, noting that such presumption would be rebuttable with 
a showing that a settlement “provide[s] a degree of competition reasonably consistent with the 
parties’ contemporaneous evaluations of their prospects of litigation success.”51  Eugene Quinn, 
the intellectual property scholar, indicates that the Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to balance “two 
competing policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs; and 
(2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to market.”52  What 
resulted, however, was “a full employment act for lawyers, and underground funding of generic 
drug manufacturers who have an incentive to challenge patented drugs.”53  The courts are faced 
with a challenge of formulating framework which would incorporate public policy favoring 
                                                            
48 FTC, supra note 46. 
49 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 208; FTC, supra note 46. 
50 FTC, supra note 46; Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1317 n.123 (citing Appeal Brief of Counsel Supporting the 
Complaint, In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Aug. 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/08/scheringtrialbrief.pdf)). 
51 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1318 n.131 (citing Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 
10, Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund, No. 05-2851-cv(L), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f247700/247708.pdf)). 
52 Eugene R. Quinn, Senate Bill Would Prevent Reverse Pharma Payments, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 6, 2009, 4:47 PM), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2009/02/06/senate-bill-would-prevent-reverse-pharma-payments/id=1950.  
53 Id. 
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settlements over litigation yet simultaneously address the harmful effects of reverse payment 
settlements in the Hatch-Waxman Act context. 
IV.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE APPROACH TO THE PAY FOR DELAY ISSUE 
 The circuit courts disagree over the legality of reverse payment settlements and the 
appropriate standard of law to apply.  Under the Sherman Act, “[e]very contract, combination in 
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”54  The Supreme Court has continuously 
disallowed only those restraints on trade that are unreasonable.
55
  In analyzing the reverse 
settlements, the circuit court opinions have shared a focus on the exclusionary power of the 
patent, but split concerning ways to balance the patentees’ rights against the policy interest in 
encouraging generic drug competition.
56
  The Supreme Court of the United States has granted 
the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari on December 7, 2012 to review the highly 
contested issue of the lawfulness of reverse settlements.
57
  Below is an overview of the three 
predominant legal theories concerning the validity of reverse settlements: the per se approach, 
the scope of the patent rule, and the rule of reason.  
 A. One Approach: Reverse Payment Settlements are Per Say Illegal 
 Some courts have found that because certain agreements are always unreasonable, and 
their anti-competitive implications clearly outweigh any potential pro-competitive benefits, these 
types of settlements are unlawful per se.
58
  This hard-line approach applies where a “practice 
                                                            
54 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
55 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
56 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1316.  
57 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7, 
2012) (No. 12-416), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/120712zr_3f14.pdf.  
58 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 
2012) (No. 12-245), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm; 
petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at 
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facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition or 
decrease output.”59  For example, courts have held horizontal price fixing, output limitations, 
market allocation, and group boycotts to be per se illegal.
60
   
 The Sixth Circuit’s decision of In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation exemplifies the 
application of per se analysis.
61
  In Cardizem, the generic manufacturer Andrx agreed not to 
market its version of the patented blood-pressure drug Cardizem CD of Hoescht Marion Roussel, 
Inc. (“HMR”) until it obtained a conclusive decision that the generic version did not infringe 
patent held by HMR.
62
  The purchasers of Cardizem CD brought a lawsuit, alleging that the 
generic company’s agreement to delay market entry caused them to suffer antitrust harm.63  The 
court was concerned with the terms of the settlement which prevented the marketing of generic 
versions of not only the brand name patented drug, but also drugs “not at issue in the pending 
litigation.”64  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that the brand name manufacturer paid “the only 
potential competitor $40 million per year to stay out of the market.”65  The court distinguished 
between merely taking advantage of a monopoly “that naturally arises from a patent” and 
“altogether . . . bolster[ing] the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying [off the 
only competitor].”66  The court concluded that the settlement was “a horizontal agreement to 
eliminate competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the entire United States, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii))) 
(quoting State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10)).  
59 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)). 
60 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
61 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004). 
62 Id. at 902. 
63 Id. at 904. 
64 Id. at 908 n.13. 
65 Id. at 908. 
66 Id.  
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classic example of a per se illegal restraint of trade.”67 
 A few years before Cardizem, the D.C. Circuit decided a Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail 
Corp. Int’l.68  In Andrx, rather than resolving the patent challenge lawsuit by settlement,69 the 
name brand pharmaceutical company offered a payment to the generic manufacturer if it agreed 
to delay marketing the generic version of the drug, while allowing the patent challenge lawsuit to 
continue.
70
  The payments were to begin on the date FDA approved the generic version of the 
drug and end when either the generic producer began selling its version of the drug or the 
abovementioned patent challenge lawsuit was resolved in favor of the patent holder.
71
  After 
obtaining the FDA approval, the brand name manufacturer began making payments of $10 
million per quarter to the generic manufacturer,
72
 and the generic manufacturer avoided 
triggering the 180-day exclusivity window by refraining from entering its version of the drug on 
the market.
73
  The court held that the agreement at issue violated Sherman Act, explaining that 
the agreement was “so broad that part of the restraint suppresse[d] competition without creating 
efficiency.
 74
  Despite these successful challenges of pay-for-delay deals against the patentee’s, 
other courts approached the issue differently, resulting in a deep split of authority.
75
 
 B.  Another Approach: the Scope of the Patent Analysis 
   Some courts declined to apply the per se rule and allowed reverse payment agreements 
                                                            
67 In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 908.  The Court also found the instant agreement resulted in the delay of the entry of 
other competitors into the market because Andrx had refused to utilize its exclusivity window.  Id. at 907.  
68 Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 931 (2002). 
69 Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements as Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 295 (The settlement 
at issue was the same settlement described above in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 
2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004)). 
70 See Andrx, 256 F.3d at 803. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 809. 
73 Id. at 804. 
74 Id. at 815. 
75 Laura J. Grebe, Comment: Generic Entry in a Rough Economy--Proposed Legislation May Ease Health Care 
Costs, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 167, 179 (2010). 
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on the grounds that they are valid settlements in patent infringement actions.
76
  Under the “scope 
of the patent” test implemented by these courts, the reverse settlement will not be invalidated if 
the exclusion does not exceed the scope of the patent, the patent owner’s infringement lawsuit 
was not objectively baseless, and the patent was not obtained fraudulently.
77
   
The Eleventh Circuit considered the issue of pay for delay deals in Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
78
  In Valley Drug, a name brand pharmaceutical company sued a 
generic producer for infringement of its patent, and the generic producer claimed the patent was 
invalid.
79
  The parties settled the lawsuit by entering into two agreements, one of which was a 
final settlement of specific claims, and the other was structured in a similar way to the 
agreements in Andrx and Cardizem and became effective while the litigation continued.
80
  The 
agreements stated that the brand name company would provide large payments to the generic 
producer to delay the market entry of the generic drug until the brand manufacturer’s patent 
expires.
81
  The district court held that the settlements involved were per se illegal and violated 
Sherman Act.
82
  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that the name brand company’s patent 
gives it the right to exclude competitors.
83
  According to the test set forth by the Eleventh 
Circuit, the court must consider “the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, the extent 
to which [the] provisions of the agreements exceed that scope, and the anticompetitive effects 
                                                            
76 Id. 
77 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (citing 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294,1312 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004)); 
see also Foster, supra note 26 at S-5. 
78 Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1294. 
79 Id. at 1299. 
80 Id. at 1300. 
81 Id.  Subsequently, the court determined in another case that the brand name company’s patent was invalid.  Id. at 
1306-7.   
82 Id. at 1301, 1306. 
83 Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306. 
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thereof.”84  If any part of the settlement agreement reached beyond the protections provided by 
the brand name company’s patent, the court would apply traditional antitrust scrutiny to those 
parts of the settlement.
85
 
The Eleventh Circuit applied the Valley Drug framework in Schering-Plough Corp. v. 
FTC.
86
  Schering-Plough (“Schering”), a large pharmaceutical company, manufactured numerous 
drugs, including K-Dur 20, a potassium chloride supplement.
87
  Schering-Plough owned a patent 
on the extended-release coating used in K-Dur 20, which was scheduled to expire in 2006.
88
  
Upsher-Smith (“Upsher”), a competing drug company, filed an ANDA for a generic version of 
K-Dur 20.
89
  In response, Schering sued for an infringement of their coating patent.
90
  Before the 
trial began, the parties signed a settlement whereby Schering agreed to pay royalty fees as well 
as 10-15% royalty payments for five of Upsher’s other drugs.91   
Meanwhile, a second competing generic manufacturer, ESI Lederle, Inc. (“ESI”), filed an 
application with the FDA to market its own generic version of K-Dur 20,
92
 including a paragraph 
IV certification challenging Schering’s extended release coating.93  Consequently, Schering 
settled with ESI as well, agreeing to pay ESI up to $15 million for ESI postponing market entry 
of its generic K-Dur 20 version.
94
  The FTC challenged both settlements as antitrust law 
violations, but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) upheld the agreements.95  On appeal, the 
                                                            
84 Id. at 1311-12. 
85 Id.  The court remanded the case to determine whether the agreement was a “reasonable implementation” of the 
“protection afforded by the patents.”  Id. at 1312. 
86 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). 
87 Id. at 1058. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 1059. 
91 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1059-60. 
92 Id. at 1060. 
93 Id. at 1060 n.5. 
94 Id. at 1061. 
95 Id. 1061. Because the FTC is an administrative agency, the hearing took place before the ALJ.  
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Eleventh Circuit agreed with the ALJ and rejected the per se rule.
96
  Instead, the court applied 
the antitrust test articulated in Valley Drug.
97
  The court explained that, taking into account the 
presumption of patent validity, the scope of Schering’s patent allowed the company to exclude 
patent infringers, but the company could not exclude beyond that.
98
  The court decided that both 
agreements did not exceed the scope of the patent at issue and the payment from Schering to 
Upsher was not a reverse settlement but a payment for drug licenses.
99
  In contrast, the 
agreement with ESI did involve a reverse payment.
100
  Nevertheless, the court focused on the 
judicial policy favoring settlements
101
 and held that the agreements in question were valid.
102
   
The more recent case to adopt this approach is FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals,
103
 where 
the Eleventh Circuit clarified that its version of the “scope of the patent” analysis conformed to 
the analysis adopted by the Second and Federal Circuits.
104
  The court upheld a settlement 
concerning a testosterone drug, indicating that “[a] patent holder and any of its challengers 
cannot enter into an agreement that excludes more competition than the patent has the potential 
to exclude.”105  The court explained that the phrase “strengths of the patent” used in Schering-
                                                            
96 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065. 
97 Id. at 1065-1066. 
98 Id. at 1068. 
99 Id. at 1071. The court decided that in the Upsher agreement, the royalty payments were for royalties on the drug 
licenses for five drugs other than K-Dur 20, and there was no evidence that these payments were excessive. Id. 
100 Id. at 1072. 
101 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1072 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. U.S., 283 U.S. 163 (1931)). 
102 Id. at 1076. 
103 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7, 
2012) (No. 12-416). 
104 Michael A. Carrier, Article: Why The “Scope Of The Patent” Test Cannot Solve The Drug Patent Settlement 
Problem, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1. (2012). The Eleventh Circuit explained that “its prior opinions did not call 
for an evaluation of the strength of the patent but rather only a determination whether, absent sham litigation or 
fraud in obtaining the patent, the settlement agreement exceeded the scope of the patent.”  In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 (Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 12-245), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm; petition for cert. filed, 
(Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-
265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii))) (citing Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311-13 n.8, 1313-14). 
105 Watson, 677 F.3d at 1308. 
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Plough Corp. v. FTC
106
 referred to “the potential exclusionary scope of the patent,” meaning 
“the exclusionary rights appearing on the patent’s face and not the underlying merits of the 
infringement claim.”107  
The Second Circuit considered the pay for delay issue in In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litigation.
108
  At issue in this case was a patent for Tamoxifen, a widely used breast 
cancer drug.
109
  Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC (“ICI”), the holder of the drug patent, 
marketed the drug through Zeneca, ICI’s subsidiary, under the brand name Nolvadex(R).110  
Barr, another pharmaceutical company, filed an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, 
seeking approval of its generic version of Tamoxifen, and ICI responded with filing an 
infringement suit.
111
  After the district court held that the patent was invalid, the ICI appealed the 
infringement suit decision, but the parties settled while the case was on appeal.
112
  Pursuant to 
their agreement, ICI granted Barr a license to sell an unbranded version of Tamoxifen under 
Barr’s label and agreed to pay Barr $21 million as well cover the costs of material supplies for 
Barr of $35.9 million over a ten year period.
113
  In exchange, Bar agreed to refrain from pursuing 
its paragraph IV certification and manufacturing its own generic version of Tamoxifen until 
ICI’s patent expired.114  The settlement ended the lawsuit between the parties instantly,115 unlike 
some of the cases mentioned above where the brand name company would be making the 
payments pending the resolution of the infringement action.   
                                                            
106 Schering, 402 F.3d at 1056 (Eleventh Circuit’s version of the scope of the patent test seemed to focus on the 
patent's “exclusionary potential” and “likelihood” of obtaining an injunction). 
107 Watson, 677 F.3d at 1311 n.8. 
108 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1144 (2007). 
109 Id. at 190. 
110 Id. at 193. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 194. 
114 Id. at 193-194 (the parties obtained a vacatur of the district court’s decision invalidating the patent). 
115 Id. at 215. 
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Subsequently, Barr’s use of its 180-day exclusivity period prevented other paragraph IV 
challengers from obtaining approval for their versions of Tamoxifen.
116
  While these companies 
again disputed the validity of ICI’s patent in court, consumer organizations filed an action 
challenging the lawfulness of the ICI-Barr settlement.
117
  The district court dismissed the 
antitrust plaintiffs’ claims, reasoning that, even though the horizontal agreements like the one at 
issue typically violate the Sherman Act, they may still be lawful when the party preventing 
competition is the patentee.
118
  The Second Circuit agreed,
119
 rejecting the idea that reverse 
settlements are per se violations of antitrust law.
120
  The court explained that as long as “the 
patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless” or beyond the scope of the patent, the 
patentee can enter into an agreement “to protect that to which it is presumably entitled: a lawful 
monopoly over the manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”121  The court held that 
“there is no injury to the market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as competition is 
restrained only within the scope of the patent.”122  The only two exceptions to this “scope of the 
patent” analysis occur where the patent was obtained by fraud or where the patent enforcement 
action was objectively baseless.
123
  The brand name company’s patent in this case would have 
effectively precluded all generic versions of Tamoxifen as any such generic drug would infringe 
the patent.
124
  The Second Circuit also admitted that the result of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
encouraging reverse payments was potentially disturbing, but the judicial preference for 
                                                            
116 Id. at 214. 
117 Id. at 196. 
118 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 197.  
119 See Quinn, supra note 30 (“The Tamoxifen court ruled that such a settlement agreement does not exceed the 
scope of the patent where (1) there was no restriction on marketing non-infringing products; (2) a generic version of 
the branded drug would necessarily infringe the branded firm’s patent; and (3) the agreement did not bar other 
generic manufacturers from challenging the patent.”). 
120 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206. 
121 Id. at 208-09, 213. 
122 Id. at 213 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 214. 
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settlement counterbalanced such troubling outcomes.
125
 
The Second Circuit distinguished Cardizem by pointing out that in addition to a large 
reverse payment, the settlement in that case involved a condition that the generic producer would 
not market other non-infringing products which were not at issue in the case.
126
  In contrast, the 
Tamoxifen settlement only concerned the drug covered by the brand name company’s patent, and 
did not “restrain[] the introduction or marketing of unrelated or non-infringing products.”127   
In subsequent reverse settlement litigation the Second Circuit panel of judges noted that 
the Tamoxifen decision lead to a substantial increase in the number of reverse settlements, 
declared that Tamoxifen was wrongly decided, and the panel encouraged the petitioners to apply 
for rehearing en banc.
128
  Rehearing en banc was subsequently denied, with one of the judges 
dissenting.
129
    
The Federal Circuit also applied the scope of the patent analysis in In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, indicating that “[t]he essence of the inquiry is whether the 
agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”130  The court 
upheld an agreement concerning an antibiotic, grounding its reasoning on the patent system’s 
presumption of the patents’ validity, which gives the patentee “the right to exclude others from 
profiting by the patented invention.”131  Accordingly, the court “agree[d] with the Second and 
Eleventh Circuits . . . that, in the absence of evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, 
                                                            
125 Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211 (“We are not unaware of a troubling dynamic that is at work in these cases. The less 
sound the patent or the less clear the infringement, and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the 
patent holder, the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the 
patent.”). 
126 Id. at 213-14. 
127 Id. 
128 Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 108-10 (2d Cir. 2010), cert, denied, 604 F.3d 
98 (2011). 
129 See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 2010).  
130 In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 
2828 (2009). 
131 Id. at 1333, 1337. 
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the court need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust analysis of a settlement 
agreement involving a reverse payment.”132  The court came to a conclusion that “all 
anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary power of the 
patent.”133  The scope of patent test in Ciprofloxacin and other cases described above focused on 
the exclusionary power of the patent, but some courts have deviated from this approach and 
instead leaned toward the antitrust analysis which could more effectively further Congressional 
goals of increasing competition between the pharmaceutical companies.
134
 
 C.  The “Quick Look” Rule of Reason Approach – the In Re K-Dur Matter 
 Some courts rejected the scope of patent analysis and instead applied the framework 
considering the anticompetitive market effects of the settlement to determine whether the 
settlement posed an unreasonable restraint on commerce.
135
  To determine whether a restraint on 
trade is unreasonable and therefore a violation of antitrust law, the courts generally apply the 
“rule of reason”:136  “the finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into account a variety of factors, including specific 
information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, 
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.”137  This “rule of reason” inquiry consists of three 
steps: first, the movant must prove that the challenged conduct led to anti-competitive results 
within the market.
138
  If the movant can meet this burden, “the burden shifts to the defendant to 
show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.”139  The 
                                                            
132 Id. at 1336. 
133 Id.  
134 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 14-15 (1984). 
135 United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 
U.S. 36, 49 (1977)). 
136 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
137 Id. 
138 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 668. 
139 Id. at 669. 
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movant can then rebut the defendant’s pro-competitive argument by proving that the restraint 
created by the defendant is not reasonably necessary to accomplish the pro-competitive end.
140
   
The Third Circuit applied the rule of reason framework to a reverse payment settlement 
in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litigation (“K-Dur”).141  K-Dur held that reverse settlements should be 
presumed to constitute unreasonable restraints on trade, unless the parties can show otherwise.
142
  
Some scholars have characterized the decision as “a home run in favor of antitrust scrutiny.”143  
According to one source, “[a]n appellate court had not offered such a skeptical treatment of [the 
reverse settlement] agreements since 2003, when the Sixth Circuit found one to be per se 
illegal.”144   
K-Dur concerned the same settlements which gave rise to Schering.
145
  The FTC filed a 
suit against the pharmaceutical companies Schering, Upsher, and ESI, claiming that the two 
settlements reached between these companies unreasonably restrained trade, violating Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
146
  The FTC argued that the reverse 
payments from Schering to the two generic brand companies, Upsher and ESI, effectively caused 
                                                            
140 Id.; In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, 81 U.S.L.W. 3090 
(Aug. 24, 2012) (No. 12-245), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-
245.htm; petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 29, 2012) (No. 12-265), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm (citing 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(D)(iii))). 
141 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 197.  On August 24, 2012, and August 29, 2012, two petitions for writ of certiorari by 
defendants Merck & Co. and Upsher, respectively, were filed appealing the Third Circuit's decision in K-Dur. 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co. (No. 12-245) (Aug. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docket files/12-245.htm; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
Upsher-Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co. (No. 12-265) (Aug. 29, 2012), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx? FileName=/docketfiles/12-265.htm. 
142 Foster, supra note 26 at S-4. 
143 Quinn, supra note 16. 
144 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004); see 
Michael Carrier, Reverse Payment Home Run for Pharma Antitrust Enforcement, IPWATCHDOG (Jul. 16, 2010, 3:50 
PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/07/16/reverse-payment-home-run-for-pharma-antitrust-
enforcement/id=26491.  
145 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 211 (citing Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 
U.S. 919 (2006) (“Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, arose out of the same settlement agreement as the instant 
appeal.”). 
146 Id. at 206-7. 
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a delay in the market entry of the generic drugs, thereby improperly preserving Schering’s 
monopoly.
147
  The ALJ dismissed the FTC’s complaint, holding that the agreements did not 
violate Section 5 of the FTC Act.
148
  Applying the rule of reason, the FTC unanimously reversed 
the ALJ’s decision, explaining that there was a “direct nexus between Schering’s payment and 
Upsher’s agreement to delay its competitive entry” and that this agreement “unreasonably 
restrain[ed] commerce.”149  According to the FTC’s decision, the entry of the parties into a 
reverse settlement raises a red flag and can result in a prima facie evidence that an agreement 
violates anti-competition laws.
150
  The FTC posited that the reverse payment at issue was 
unlawful because the defendants could not show either that the settlement payment was for 
something other than generic drug’s delayed entry, or that the payment had pro-competitive 
effects.
151
  Consequently, Schering appealed the ruling of the FTC to the Eleventh Circuit, which 
reversed the ALJ’s decision.152  Other private parties filed lawsuits alleging that the agreements 
violated antitrust laws, which were consolidated in the District of New Jersey.
153
  The district 
court adopted the scope of the patent test.
154
 
On appeal, the Third Circuit disagreed with the district court’s reasoning, and instead 
adopted a “quick look” rule of reason analysis.155  The court explained that in some instances 
courts use “an antitrust analysis that falls between the full rule of reason inquiry on the one hand 
and the rigid per se approach on the other,” also known as “quick look” or “truncated rule of 
                                                            
147 Id. at 207. 
148 Id. (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp., Initial Decision, 136 F.T.C. 956, 1092, 1263 (2002)). 
149 Id. (citing In re Schering-Plough Corp., Final Order, 136 F.T.C. 956, 991, 1000-01, 1052 (2003)). 
150 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207 (citing Schering, 136 F.T.C. at 991, 1000-01). 
151 Id.(citing Schering, 136 F.T.C. at 956,  988-89, 1061). 
152 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006). 
153 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 207. 
154 Id. at 208. 
155 Foster, supra note 26 at S-5. 
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reason” analysis.156  The quick look rule of reason test applies where the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that “the defendant has engaged in practices similar to those subject to per se 
treatment.”157  The fact finder treats any agreement between a generic patent challenger and the 
patentee where the patent challenger delays market entry of its generic drug in exchange for the 
payment as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on commerce.
158
  If the plaintiff 
can meet this burden, he or she is no longer required to demonstrate the anti-competitive results 
of these practices on the market; instead, the burden shifts to the defendant, who can rebut the 
presumption of illegality by showing that the reverse agreement has pro-competitive benefits or 
that the payment was for a purpose other than delaying market entry.
159
   
The clear split between the circuits, made sharper by the K-Dur decision, finally set the 
stage for the Supreme Court’s resolution of the reverse payment settlement issue.  In December 
of 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watson.
160
  The defendants in K-Dur also 
sought Supreme Court review, but the Court is holding that petition pending its ruling in 
Watson.
161
 The Court is likely to hear oral argument in Watson during the last two weeks of 
March 2013.
162
 
V.  PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO PAY FOR DELAY PROBLEM 
 In deciding Watson, the Supreme Court should take into consideration the legislative 
history and proposed legislative solutions to reverse settlements.  Even the main drafters of the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Senator Orrin Hatch and Congressman Waxman, expressed disapproval of 
                                                            
156 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 209 (citing United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 218. 
159 Id. 
160 FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3324 (U.S. Dec. 7, 
2012) (No. 12-416). 
161 U.S. Supreme Court to Rule on “Pay-for-Delay” Antitrust Issue, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Dec. 10, 2012), 
http://www.mwe.com/US-Supreme-Court-to-Rule-on-Pay-for-Delay-Antitrust-Issue-12-10-2012. 
162 Id.; Lisa H. Wang, Proposed Bill Seeks to Answer the Pay for Delay Debate, IP LAW ALERT (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.iplawalert.com/tags/payfordelay.  
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reverse settlements.
163
  Many scholars as well as the FTC and the DOJ have put forth an array of 
solutions to the pay for delay controversy.
164
  For example, Christopher M. Holman proposed 
eliminating the 180-day exclusivity period for first Paragraph IV applicants from the Hatch-
Waxman Act to avoid many of the reverse payment settlement issues.
165
 Another option would 
be to allow subsequent generic ANDA filers who submit a paragraph IV certification to be 
eligible for the 180-day exclusivity window.
166
  Yet these solutions might prove ineffective 
because lessening the advantages for generic drug manufacturers to challenge patented drugs 
could disincentivize them from challenging name brand patents,
167
 despite the fact that generic 
drug manufacturers would still retain other incentives to challenge patents without incurring 
considerable risk.
168
 
Though Congress is well aware of the Hatch-Waxman issue concerning pay for delay 
deals, so far its attempts to address the problem have failed.
169
 The past few Congresses included 
several propositions of the bills to outlaw or limit the use of the reverse payment settlements in 
the context of Hatch-Waxman patent infringement lawsuits.
170
  Some of the earlier Senate bills, 
such as S. 316 in the 110th Congress (2007-2008), promoted a per se illegality approach, seeking 
to amend the Clayton Act to adopt the presumption of illegality as to reverse settlement.
171
  This 
drastic measure was deemed politically unacceptable, and subsequent bills proposed instead to 
                                                            
163 Quinn, supra note 30. 
164 Opderbeck, supra note 1717 at 1320. 
165 Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 494-500 (2007). 
166 Quinn, supra note 30. 
167 Quinn, supra note 52 (“The generic drug companies have every incentive in the world under Hatch-Waxman to 
challenge the patents held by pharmaceutical companies, but they reap a tremendous reward when they challenge the 
patents and then ultimately back off due to a settlement of the dispute.”). 
168 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1326 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) (2006)). 
169 Quinn, supra note 16. 
170 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1318 (citing Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. § 2(b) 
(as reported and amended by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Oct. 15, 2009); Protecting Consumer Access to Generic 
Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 11th Cong. § 2(a) (2009)). 
171 Gregory, supra note 19 at 3. 
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apply the established antitrust rule of reason framework to evaluate the legality of reverse 
payments.
172
  S. 369, entitled the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act,
173
 introduced in 
111th Congress, initially advised for the per se approach, but its later modification called for the 
rule of reason approach, treating reverse payments as presumptively anti-competitive and 
allowing for the presumption to be overcome with a showing that the pro-competitive results of 
the deal outweighed the anti-competitive outcomes.
174
  In addition, the bill contained a list of 
factors that the court could incorporate into its rule of reason framework.
175
  The bill would also 
allow a safe harbor for agreements in which the ANDA applicant is permitted to enter the market 
earlier and is reimbursed for “reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed $ 7,500,000.”176   
The present successor of S. 369, S. 27 in the current 112th Congress adopts the rule of 
reason approach as well.
177
  Like its first two predecessors, S. 27 was favorably reported in 2011, 
but the likelihood of this bill coming to a vote in the full Congress is low.
178
  Based on the 
Senate’s inability to enact any of these measures, the Senate opponents of reverse payments have 
                                                            
172 Id. 
173 Wang, supra note 162. 
174 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1319 (citing S. 369 § 3(a).  The revised version of the bill explained that reverse 
settlements “have unduly delayed the marketing of low-cost generic drugs contrary to free competition, the interests 
of consumers, and the principles underlying antitrust law.”  S. 369 § 2(a)(6)(B). If passed, S. 369 would amend the 
Clayton Act by adding a Section 29.  See S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
175 Id. (quoting S. 369 § 3(a)).The factors are:  
(1) the length of time remaining until the end of the life of the relevant patent, compared with the agreed 
upon entry date for the ANDA product; 
(2) the value to consumers of the competition from the ANDA product allowed under the agreement; 
(3) the form and amount of consideration received by the ANDA filer in the agreement resolving or settling 
the patent infringement claim; 
(4) the revenue the ANDA filer would have received by winning the patent litigation; 
(5) the reduction in the NDA holder's revenues if it had lost the patent litigation; 
(6) the time period between the date of the agreement conveying value to the ANDA filer and the date of 
the settlement of the patent infringement claim; and 
(7) any other factor that the fact finder, in its discretion, deems relevant to its determination of competitive 
effects under this subsection.  
176 Id. 
177 Gregory, supra note 19 at 3. 
178 Id. S. 316 and S. 369 were also favorably reported, but neither of the two came to a vote in the full senate. Id. 
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put forward proposals endorsing more limited solutions.
179
  Specifically, on May 24, 2012, 
Senator Bingamon proposed an amendment to S. 3187, the FDA Safety and Innovations Act, 
which would disqualify the generic drug manufacturers who were the first to apply for an 
approval of their generic version of the drug, but subsequently agreed to delay market entry, 
from their eligibility for the 180-day exclusivity period.
180
  This amendment, however, failed by 
a vote of 28-67.
181
   
The reason behind Congress’ inability thus far to address the problem of reverse payment 
settlements may be the fact that these agreements are a natural result of the Hatch-Waxman 
framework.
182
  The legislation itself authorizes any “gaming” pertaining to the Hatch-Waxman 
framework.
183
  The Hatch-Waxman Act creates a scheme of risk distribution where generic 
manufacturers have all the incentives to file a paragraph IV certification.
 184
  The potential 
benefits a brand name company may receive from entering its drug on the market or from 
receiving a reverse payment from the patentee as a settlement of the patent infringement suit 
outweigh any losses the generic manufacturers may incur.
185
  Conversely, the brand name 
company may lose its monopoly over the drug and end up liable for costs and attorneys fees – a 
high stake.
186
  In summary, thus far the proposed solutions to pay-for-delay problem have not 
been successful.  
VI.  ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
                                                            
179 Id.  
180 Id.  
181 Id.  
182 See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 
1144 (2007). 
183 Practising Law Institute, FTC Fed up with Hatch-Waxman Gaming, Goes on Offense, PATENT LAW PRACTICE 
CENTER (Oct. 11, 2012, 6:17PM), http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2012/10/11/ftc-fed-up-with-hatch-waxman-gaming-
goes-on-offense.   
184  Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207 (quoting Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006)).  
185 Id. 
186  Id.; see also Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1325-26 (citing Schering, 402 F.3d at 1070). 
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 In addition to the conflicting judicial frameworks adopted by the circuits who considered 
the reverse settlement issue and the failed attempts by Congress to address the problem, the 
relevant administrative agencies as well as a number of scholars have proposed ways to address 
the harmful outcomes of reverse payment settlements.  
 A.  Presumption of Illegality Versus Determining the Strength of the Patent on the Merits 
The proposed legal and legislative frameworks to deal with reverse payment settlements 
are either based on the antitrust law or center around patent law.  The FTC recommended that the 
federal legislation simply disallows all settlements in situations where the generic drug company 
receives compensation in exchange for not placing its generic product on the market.
187
  The 
Third Circuit agreed with the FTC that the courts should not consider the merits of the 
underlying patent challenge lawsuit, thereby adopting the test based on antitrust law.
188
 Under 
this test, unless countervailing proof is available, “it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo 
for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that represents 
an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”189  The DOJ similarly posited that it is “neither 
necessary nor appropriate” for the court to determine the likelihood of success of the patent 
challenge claim because such information would have been available to the parties at the time 
they reached the settlement agreement.”190  Yet, the DOJ indicated that “[l]iability properly turns 
on whether, in avoiding the prospect of invalidation that accompanies infringement litigation, the 
                                                            
187 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1317 (citing  Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay Settlements in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Why Consumers and the Federal Government Are Paying Too Much for Prescription Drugs: Hearing on 
H.R. 1706 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 
(2009) (prepared statement of Richard A. Feinstein, Director, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/06/P859910payfordelay.pdf)). 
188 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing In re Schering Plough Corp., Final Order, 
136 F.T.C. 956, 988 (2003) (internal citations and brackets omitted)).  
189 Id. 
190 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1318 (citation omitted).  
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parties have by contract obtained more exclusion than warranted in light of that prospect.”191  
The DOJ further explained that if the payment to the potential patent infringer does not exceed 
the costs of litigation, the payor would rebut the presumption of illegality.
192
  According to the 
DOJ, the settlement agreements that prevent generic entry before the patent expires would not 
meet this burden.
193
 
Scott Hemphill agreed that “a settlement should be accorded a presumption of illegality 
as an unreasonable restraint of trade if the settlement both restricts the generic firm's ability to 
market a competing drug and includes compensation from the innovator to the generic firm.”194  
Hemphill acknowledged that such strict antitrust approach could create over-deterrence and 
invalidate potentially beneficial settlements.
 195
  Nevertheless, Hemphill indicated that under-
deterrence would be more detrimental because allowing reverse settlements will continue 
decreasing public’s access to the pharmaceutical products.196  Likewise, Michael Carrier favored 
the antitrust framework and considering reverse settlements presumptively unlawful.
197
  
Conversely, Daniel Crane advocated that reverse settlements should be resolved under 
the intellectual property law and that the courts should assess the probability of success of the 
patent challenge lawsuit on the merits.
198
  The courts should make ex ante determination of the 
likelihood that the patent challenger’s lawsuit is successful.199  Based on this determination, the 
courts would invalidate the settlements in which the probability of the challenger’s success was 
                                                            
191 Id.  
192 Id.  
193 Id.  
194 C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1616 (2006). 
195 Id.; see C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking To Preserve 
Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 663-70 (2009). 
196 Id. 
197 Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. 
REV. 37, 67-70 (2009). 
198 Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic 
Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2002). 
199 Id. 
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high.
200
 According to Crane, restrictive tests to determine the validity of reverse settlements 
would be detrimental and create uncertainty.
201
  David W. Opderbeck agreed that any framework 
which would hold all reverse payments presumptively unlawful would pose a threat of over-
deterrence and invalidate potentially beneficial and legitimate reverse settlements.
202
  Opderbeck 
also notes, however, that “[p]atent rights are probabilistic, not certain, because validity and 
infringement are always decided after the alleged infringement through litigation.”203  Hence, it 
is impossible to make an ex ante determination of the patent scope with certainty.
204
 
 B.  Using the Settlement Value to Determine the Strength of the Patent 
The FTC and DOJ recommendations are in conformance with the Third Circuit’s 
reasoning in In re K-Dur.  Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, and Mark A. Lemley propose a 
somewhat similar framework to adjudicate pay for delay agreements as that adopted in K-Dur.
205
  
These scholars, like the K-Dur decision, posit that reverse payments should be presumed 
unlawful, and the burden to prove the infringement should rest on the plaintiff.
206
  Under their 
framework, however, intellectual property litigation concerning patent strength would still be 
required in highly contested cases,
207
 and the rule of reason should apply only in certain cases 
where the antitrust analysis is clear.
208
  The authors recognize that litigating the validity of the 
patent is costly,
209
 thus, only in highly contested cases the plaintiff who filed the infringement 
suit would be required to demonstrate that “(1) that the ex ante likelihood of prevailing in its 
                                                            
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 749. 
202 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1323. 
203 Id. at 1331-32. 
204 Id. at 1332. 
205 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property 
Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003). 
206 Id. at 1759.  
207 Id. at 1729. 
208 Id. at 1725, 1732-33; see also Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1320-21 for a more detailed explanation of the 
framework proposed by Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley.  
209 Id. at 1732. 
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infringement lawsuit is significant, and (2) that the size of the payment is no more than the 
expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit.”210  Yet, the courts “need 
not be particularly searching” in their inquiry concerning the patent infringement; they must only 
focus on determining where “there is a legitimate dispute being settled.”211   
 Thomas Cotter opposes the proposal that the courts should analyze the patent challenge 
disputes on their merits.
212
  Cotter notes that such approach would undermine the benefits the 
parties seek to achieve by settling.
213
 Instead, Cotter argues that the potential value of the 
litigation costs should be compared to the amount of the settlement to determine the validity of 
the agreement.
214
  Opderbeck opines that both approaches mentioned above are problematic 
because they “threaten to over-deter potentially beneficial settlements.”215  Such over-deterrence 
would result from both the proposals comparing the settlements amounts with the litigation costs 
to determine the settlement’s lawfulness and the proposals using the settlement amount to 
determine the strength of the patent at issue.
216
  Such approaches could result in “false positives” 
as they fail to recognize that reverse settlements may in fact be beneficial to the consumers in 
certain cases.
217
  Opderbeck explains that if the settlement amounts are used as the only measure 
to determine the validity of the patent, the patent will either be upheld and prevent any generic 
competition during the remainder of the patent term, or the patent will be struck down.
218
  Yet, 
the terms of most reverse settlements allow market entry of the generic drug at some point before 
                                                            
210 Hovenkamp, supra note 205 at 1732. 
211 Id. at 1760. 
212 Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of Patent Disputes Involving 
Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1815 (2003). 
213 Id. at 1795.  
214 See generally id. at 1802-10. 
215 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1323. 
216 Id. at 1324-25. 
217 Id. (citing C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and Rulemaking To 
Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 669-70 (2009)).  
218 Id. 
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the patent expiration date.
219
  A reverse payment agreement that leads to a reduced patent term is 
often more beneficial to the public than the patent challenge litigation and subsequent appeals.
220
 
 The settlement amounts should not be used to determine the strength of the patent 
because many reverse settlements include license agreements and other side deals.
221
  In 
addition, the generic Paragraph IV applicant does not risk much by filing the infringement suit, 
while the patent owner risks losing a significant revenue-producing asset.
222
  The patent owner 
must also factor in the possibility of additional Paragraph IV applicants challenging its patent 
when determining the amount of the settlement.
223
  Therefore, settlement value should not be 
used as an indicator of the strength of the patent. 
 C.  Creating a Scale of Anticompetitive Effects to Evaluate the Reverse Settlement  
 Each of the approaches discussed above is problematic in one way or another and 
revolves around the exclusionary power of the patent.
224
  Opderbeck proposed evaluating reverse 
settlements based on an inquiry into the actual anti-competitive effects of these agreements,
225
 
which would be more efficient and allow more certainty in the settlement bargaining process.
226
  
A Settlement Competition Index (“SCI”) would “provide[ ] a rough empirical gauge of the 
potential anticompetitive effects of the settlement.”227  The SCI would be based on two criteria: 
“(1) The difference in product market concentration that would likely result from the agreement 
and (2) [t]he probability that the patent will be held to be valid and infringed.”228  In other words, 
                                                            
219 Id. 
220 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1324-25. 
221 Id. at 1325 (citing Hemphill, supra note 195 at 663-69).  
222 Id. at 1325-26 (citation omitted).  
223 Id. at 1328. 
224 Id. 
225 See generally Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1323-1329.   
226 Id. at 1329. 
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
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the first part assesses the power of the patent, and the second part assesses its scope.
229
  The 
lower range of the SCI would be a “safety zone,” and the settlements falling under it would be 
presumed lawful based on the legitimate exclusionary power of the patent.
230
  Settlements falling 
at the higher range of the SCI would be declared per se illegal.
231
  Settlements falling in the 
middle would undergo a balancing test under the rule of reason.
232
  When the settlement at issue 
requires such heightened evaluation, the court or regulatory agency would consider a number of 
factors under the rule of reason to establish whether the agreement was reasonable.
233
 Opderbeck 
notes that because the agreements falling at the middle range of SCI would involve a degree of 
uncertainty and expense to evaluate, the companies will be less likely to enter into such 
settlements.
234
  
 Indeed, the SCI would streamline the court’s task of evaluating the legality of reverse 
payment settlements and circumvent the problem of over- and under-deterrence.  The ex ante 
determination of the patent validity, however, would still be required for the settlements falling 
in the middle range of the spectrum.  Opderbeck proposes that to avoid a “’trial within a trial’ on 
patent strength,” courts could engage experts or institute procedures to reasonably estimate 
patent strength without holding a complete infringement trial.
235
  Because a complete, final 
determination of patent’s validity would not be necessary, and a reasonable assessment would be 
satisfactory for this proposal, utilization of an index such as SCI would be the most effective 
framework for the judiciary to answer the question of reverse settlement lawfulness. 
                                                            
229 Id. at 1339. 
230 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1329. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1346 (The factors include the amount of the reverse settlement payment; the length of delay in generic 
entry; the existence and nature of any ancillary licenses; the existence and nature of any licenses related to products 
unrelated to the patented compound; and any other facts suggesting that the agreement is, or is not, likely to have 
unreasonable anticompetitive effects.”). 
234 Id. at 1347. 
235 Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1337. 
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VII.  THE MOST EFFICIENT JUDICIAL SOLUTION TO THE PAY FOR DELAY PROBLEM 
The scope of the patent test adopted by the Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits does 
not provide adequate solution to the pay for delay issue.  The Third Circuit in K-Dur explained 
that where the court applies the scope of the patent test, a reverse payment case usually does not 
go to trial, thus the test fails to subject reverse settlements to any antitrust scrutiny.
236
  The courts 
who adopted the scope of the patent test to adjudicate the validity of pay for delay settlements 
have failed to recognize “that the ‘scope of the patent’ test applied by the courts assumes the 
very validity that is at issue in these cases.”237  Therefore, the courts must look at whether the 
patent is actually valid and take into account the fact that patents merely represent “a legal 
conclusion reached by the Patent Office.”238  In many cases patents turn out to be invalid or not 
infringed, and according to a study conducted by the FTC, “in Hatch-Waxman challenges made 
under Paragraph IV, the generic challenger prevailed seventy-three percent of the time.”239  This 
explains the incentive that the holder of a weak patent has to settle the patent challenge lawsuit, 
thereby buying its way out of the competition with the generic company as well as possible 
patent invalidation.
240
 
Therefore, the scope of the patent test would allow the patent holder of even the weakest 
patent to prevail, resulting in under-deterrence of the illicit reverse settlement and causing 
serious detriment to consumers by delaying entry of generic drugs on the market.  Applying the 
per se approach to all reverse settlements would cause over-deterrence and invalidate some 
                                                            
236 In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012). 
237 Carrier, supra note 144.  
238 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)). 
239 Id. (citing FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration 16 (2002), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases — An 
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385 (2000) (noting that between 1983 and 1999 the 
alleged infringer prevailed in forty-two percent of patent cases that reached trial)). 
240 Id. (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The less sound the 
patent or the less clear the infringement, and therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder, 
the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the patent.”)). 
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reverse settlements which would potentially benefit the public.  Therefore, most of the solutions 
to the pay for delay problem adopted by the circuit courts or proposed by the distinguished 
scholars would cause over- or under-deterrence of the reverse settlements.  The best judicial 
solution to this challenging issue is the creation of a scale based on the anticompetitive effects of 
reverse settlements such as the one proposed by David W. Opderbeck.
241
  Adopting this 
approach would prevent over- and under-deterrence by allowing the courts or regulatory 
agencies to uphold the settlements potentially beneficial to the consumers while declaring those 
with highly anti-competitive effects per se unlawful.   
 Public interest favors exploitation of ideas, and because weak patents may undermine this 
goal, it is in the best interest of the public that the weak patents are eliminated through the court 
system.
242
  Congress enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act with a goal of attaining balance between 
the interests of the patentees and the necessary incentives to the patent challengers to enable and 
encourage competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
243
  As the Third Circuit elucidated, “[t]he 
line that Congress drew between these competing objectives strongly supports the application of 
rule of reason scrutiny of reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.”244  This 
approach is not inconsistent with the scale-based approach described above: the courts would 
consider the anticompetitive effects of the settlements falling at the middle of the sliding scale 
                                                            
241 See generally Opderbeck, supra note 17 at 1323-1329.   
242 K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 215-216 (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1993) 
(explaining the “importance to the public at large of resolving questions of patent validity” and noting the danger of 
“grant[ing] monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid patents”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (noting that the patent laws embody “a careful balance between the need to promote 
innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself 
and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy”); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892) (“It is as 
important to the public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really 
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.”)). 
243 Id. at 217 (citing 130 Cong. Rec. 24425 (Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman underscoring the 
“fundamental balance of the bill”); H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984) (emphasizing that the bill achieves 
“what the Congress has traditionally done in the area of intellectual property law[:] balance the need to stimulate 
innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest”), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2715.)). 
244 Id. 
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more deeply based on their merits.  Hence, some form of the sliding scale framework should be 
adopted by the Supreme Court as the most effective judicial solution to the problem.  
VIII. USE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION TO FIGHT THE PROBLEM OF DRUG ACCESSIBILITY, 
INCLUDING THE HARMFUL RESULTS OF REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS 
Even if the Supreme Court adopts a form of the sliding scale framework described above, 
the reverse settlements will still remain a source of lengthy, costly, and complicated litigation, at 
least for those settlements deserving higher scrutiny.  Furthermore, the fundamental interest of 
the consumers in the availability of accessibly-priced generic drugs will only be addressed 
partially with the resolution of the current circuit split.  The larger-scale problem of the 
accessibility of drugs to the public will remain largely unresolved.   
Despite the justifications to the current patent system delineated at the beginning of this 
Comment, this system results in wastefulness, in part because the pharmaceutical companies 
have to cover the costs of filing and litigating patents, often in many countries.
245
  Moreover, the 
pharmaceutical companies are profit-oriented and place very low or no emphasis on promoting 
the optimum use of their products or ensuring that the medicines are utilized by only those who 
need them.
246
  Therefore, the current patent system results in excessive drug prices that should 
instead be subject to competition, in line with the aims of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  To alleviate 
this dire problem, the government should take measures involving financial regulation by 
implementing specific types of payment systems.  
One institutional reform proposed by many scholars, known as the Health Impact Fund 
(“HIF”), could alleviate the problems of the newly globalised patent monopoly by providing an 
                                                            
245 Banerjee, supra note 5. 
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additional source of incentives and rewards to promote development of new pharmaceuticals.
247
    
The HIF would allow more effective use of available medicines, higher profits for drug 
companies, and the worldwide improvement of the health delivery system.
248
  This novel way of 
paying for pharmaceutical improvement would provide pharmaceutical companies with constant 
financial incentives to develop drugs that have significant effects on global health and to provide 
these drugs worldwide at the lowest possible cost of manufacture and distribution.
249
   
 The HIF would be formed as an international agency underwritten by governments.
250
   
The pharmaceutical companies would have the option to register with the HIF their most 
effective new products.
251
  Registering will enable these companies to receive a set amount of 
remuneration for a defined time period, like 10 years.
252
  Each registrant would receive a share of 
the fund proportional to the registrant’s contribution to the improvement of health due to their 
registered product.
253
  The registrant would thus be encouraged to produce medications 
addressing the most harmful global health threats.
254
  To receive its share of funds, the registrant 
would also be required to sell the product “at no more than the lowest feasible cost of production 
and distribution, and after the end of the reward period offer free licences [sic] to enable generic 
manufacture and sales.”255  This would allow the populations otherwise unable to afford the 
pharmaceuticals sold at a patent mark-up to gain access to these pharmaceuticals due to their low 
sale prices.
256
  Moreover, the registrant companies would have incentives to ensure that their 
                                                            
247 Id. 
248 Celermajer, supra note 1. 
249 Banerjee, supra note 5. 
250 Id. 
251 Celermajer, supra note 1. 
252 Banerjee, supra note 5. 
253 Id. 
254 Celermajer, supra note 1. 
255 Banerjee, supra note 5.  Additionally, HIF can ‘reward development of new products, new uses for existing 
products, and clinical testing of traditional medicines that patents alone cannot stimulate.”  Id.  
256 Celermajer, supra note 1. 
Anelia Dikovytska  Comment – Final Draft 
Page 35 of 38 
 
products, in addition to being widely available, are also adequately prescribed and optimally 
used, because their reward would be based on the global health impact of their product.
257
   
The most significant objection to the proposal of creating the HIF is the difficulty of 
assessing global health impact of a particular medicine.
258
  In comparison with the present 
situation, however, the advantages of the HIF are obvious because its basis for rewards would 
use much more information than the current reward system takes into account.
259
  Furthermore, 
the cost of obtaining the global effects data is outweighed by the cost-effectiveness produced by 
HIF, saving money to all those who pay for medicines, including all patients, rich and poor, and 
taxpayers.
 260
   
William W. Fisher and Talha Syed agree with the idea of “increasing . . . the extent to 
which pharmaceutical firms must conduct research on diseases common in developing countries 
or by requiring the firms to make the fruits of that research available at low prices to the 
residents of those countries.”261  In addition, to address the drug accessibility issue on a national, 
as opposed to global, level, Fisher and Syed propose amending or modifying laws which govern 
the production and distribution of pharmaceuticals.
262
  Specifically, the government should 
increase control over the prices of pharmaceuticals, establish closer monitoring over what 
investment choices the pharmaceutical companies make, and dedicate more public funds to drug 
research and development.
263
   
The states have an ability to set rates for pharmaceuticals:  “Congress gave the states 
significant flexibility in rate setting in order to encourage them to experiment with different 
                                                            
257 Id. 
258 Banerjee, supra note 5. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
261 William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Healthcare: Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581, 674 (2007). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
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payment and health delivery models that would reduce cost and deliver care more efficiently.”264  
Through the Medicaid Act and other legislation, Congress clarified its position that rates must be 
appropriate to accomplish other program goals, such as providing that the public has equal 
access to health care that is timely and of good quality.
265
  In addition, the states must follow 
certain procedural guidelines to comply with the law, including proposing rates for federal 
approval and providing the public with adequate notice and chance to comment.
266
  While the 
delivery and payment system addressed in the article pertains to rate setting for health care 
services, the pharmaceuticals can be subjected to a similar approach.  Medicare and Medicaid 
could regulate their expenditures by covering only a percentage of the brand name drug cost that 
equals or somewhat exceeds the expected cost of this drug’s generic version.  Private insurance 
companies could establish similar cost regulation frameworks.   
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (“CMS”) delegated the responsibility to 
oversee the state rate-setting process to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”).267  Until very recently, the HHS has not utilized its rulemaking power to offer 
guidance to the states, health care providers, or the consumers about the rate-setting procedure 
and factors the states should consider to evaluate the adequacy of such rates.
268
  Similarly, the 
CMS has not exercised its enforcement authority to refuse state rate cuts that infringe federal 
law.
269
   
In accordance with the recommendations of the Institute of Medicine, Stephen M. 
Shortell and Lawrence P. Casalino suggest creating a national system measuring performance by 
                                                            
264 Brietta R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama Administration Is 
Undermining Its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L.J. 771, 774 (2012). 
265 Id. at 774. 
266 Id.  
267 Id.  
268 Id. at 775. 
269 Clark, supra note 264. 
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assessing the quality and cost of health care.
270
  This measurement system could be used by CMS 
to develop a payment system based on value of the services rendered.
271
  The Agency for Health 
Research and Quality (“AHRQ”) could take on the responsibility to monitor the payment 
system.
272
  Additionally, Shortell and Casalino advocate that “Medicare make fundamental 
changes in payment to reward providers based on the value (outcomes achieved / cost) of care 
delivered.”273  The CMS should have the authority to allocate the rewards to health providers 
based on the results they achieved.
274
  Once again, although the article focuses on health care 
providers, similar approach can be implemented to regulate the quality and cost of 
pharmaceutical products.  
Although one could regard such government regulation as an unlawful interference with 
the companies’ freedom,275 the state action already heavily influences the shape of all of its 
markets, including the market in pharmaceuticals.
276
  Because of the persistent market failures 
with respect to the pharmaceutical industry and its failure to maximize social welfare, the 
governmental interference, participation, and monitoring in allocation of healthcare funds is not 
only desirable but necessary.
277
 
IX. CONCLUSION  
 The judiciary, the legislature, and the legal scholars agree that the objective of the Hatch-
                                                            
270 Stephen M. Shortell & Lawrence P. Casalino, Accountable Care Systems for Comprehensive Health Care Reform 
(Mar. 2007), at 18, available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/21919.pdf. 
271 Id. 
272 Id. at 18-19. 
273 Id. at 20. 
274 Id. 
275 Fisher, supra note 261. 
276 Id. at 675 (explaining that “all transactions within those markets take place within a legal-institutional framework 
enforced by government, a framework that shapes considerably the liberty and bargaining power of agents and the 
resultant distribution of goods.”) 
277 Id. 
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Waxman Act was to increase the availability of low cost generic drugs to the public.
278
  The 
long-standing dispute regarding the reverse settlements should be resolved by the Supreme Court 
by adopting the sliding scale approach based on the relative anticompetitive effect of the reverse 
settlement.  This would ensure that the legitimate settlements are upheld while anti-competitive 
behavior based on invalid patents is eliminated.  Nevertheless, the judicial solution to pay-for-
delay deals is insufficient to meet the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Establishing the HIF is a 
fair, cost-efficient way of promoting research and development of important pharmaceuticals and 
making these pharmaceuticals accessible worldwide.  In the United States, to drastically increase 
the accessibility of pharmaceuticals and thereby improve health, the federal government, the 
states, and the private insurance companies should consider effectuating financial regulation 
techniques, such as rate setting for the prices of specific drugs, to reduce the costs of health care 
and provide long-term benefits to the consumers. 
                                                            
278 H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647. 
